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Abstract. Ethnology has long been seen as concerned with, as one would 
nowadays say, ‘constructing the nation’, thus invariably lending support to the 
nationalist project. In the nineteenth century, this was a matter of consolidat-
ing the emerging nation states primarily, but not only in Central, Eastern and 
Southern Europe. Whereas in the twentieth-century some Western European 
states have experienced regional nationalism (e.g. in Catalonia or Scotland) as a 
significant political force that draws on more or less spurious distinctions of Self 
and Other, in Central Europe – especially in Germany – there has been a greater 
reluctance to use any discourse of indigeneity, due to its past and present ideo-
logical abuse, making appropriate contextualisation of cultural heritage in terms 
of place and memory, necessary for any nationalist project, rather difficult. 
Key words: European ethnology, ‘salvage ethnology’, Cultural anthropology, 
Self, Other, Third.
Anotacija. Etnologija jau kuris laikas įprastai siejama su „tautos (nacijos) kon-
stravimo“ sampratomis, todėl nuolat linkstama remti tautinius projektus. XIX a. 
istoriniame bei socialiniame kontekste tai padėjo aiškiau apibrėžti vienų ar kitų 
tautinių valstybių susiformavimą, tačiau ne tik Centrinės, Rytų ir Pietų Europos 
šalių atvejais. Tačiau ir XX a. kai kurios Vakarų Europos tautos iškėlė region-
inio nacionalizmo idėjas (Katalonija, Škotija), tapusias reikšmingais politiniais 
judėjimais. Kartu čia yra natūraliai operuojama bei diskutuojama sąvokomis Aš 
(Pats, Savas) ir Kitas. O Centrinėje Europoje (ypač Vokietijoje) dėl objektyvių 
istorinės ir ideologinės patirties priežasčių iki pat šiol vengiama kalbėti bet koki-
omis vietinėmis regionalizmo ar nacionalizmo temomis. Čia bet koks tautinės 
kultūros paveldo kontekstualizavimas vietos ar atminties aspektais moksliniuose 
projektuose vis dar susiduria su rimtomis problemomis. Visa tai ir yra aptariama 
šiame straipsnyje.
Pagrindiniai žodžiai: europinė etnologija, „greitosios pagalbos“ etnologija, 
kultūrinė antropologija, Aš, Kitas, Trečias. 
 
The Predicament(s) of Ethnology
As a former President of the International Society for Ethnology and Folk-
lore, I am acutely aware of the widely held public – and indeed academic – stereo-
types of what ethnology is, and is about. In the American tradition, the prevailing 
focus is on, as I have summarised it on occasion, ‘stones, bones and tones’, that 
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is, ethnology as primarily archaeology, biological anthropology and linguistics. 
In the European tradition, it has been that, too, but the term is more commonly 
used either as a synonym to what the British call ‘social anthropology’ or, in 
conjunction with ‘European’ or an appropriate national designation, to signal an 
ideological (if not always a practical) departure from old-fashioned folklore stud-
ies, nowadays often derided as ‘salvage ethnology’. It is with the European incar-
nations that I am concerned here. 
Ever since my conversion from the modern day religion of economics to the 
secular yet nonetheless spiritual ontology of ethnology, which occurred during 
my doctoral studies of ‘informal’ economic practices and structures in western 
Ireland, I have sought ways of overcoming the methodological nationalism and 
parochial introversion that ethnology and its antecedents have historically been 
(rightly or wrongly!) accused of. Research into the history of ideas and practices – 
we hear and read much about the former but far less about the latter – will throw 
up plentiful examples corroborating these charges, but it must be stressed that 
there is also ample evidence for the contrary viewpoint: that ethnology has always 
been, at least in some of its cultural expressions, international, comparative, and 
cosmopolitan in its outlook. This is not the place to delve into the depths of his-
torical research on the matter, nor is it possible to review contemporary ideas and 
practices in great detail. Hence I want to concentrate on one particular aspect, 
and one that has been a most frequent source of contention. 
Ethnology has long been seen as concerned with, as one would nowadays 
say, ‘constructing the nation’, thus invariably lending support to the national-
ist project. In the nineteenth century, this was a matter of consolidating the 
emerging nation states primarily, but not only in Central, Eastern and Southern 
Europe. Whereas in the twentieth-century some Western European states have 
experienced regional nationalism (e.g. in Catalonia or Scotland) as a significant 
political force that draws on more or less spurious distinctions of Self and Other, 
in Central Europe – especially in Germany – there has been a greater reluctance 
to use any discourse of indigeneity, due to its past and present ideological abuse, 
making appropriate contextualisation of cultural heritage in terms of place and 
memory, necessary for any nationalist project, rather difficult. The complex af-
finities of place are a matter of community engagement more than geographical 
determinism, and the social and moral force of a sense of place may even reach 
sacramental proportions, especially when fused with prominent elements of per-
sonal and ethnic identity (Basso 1996: 148). Remembering is therefore a chal-
lenge, particularly for groups that have to come to terms with a past of national-
ism and colonialism, but importantly also where the national project involves 
groups that are not originally ‘from here’ (however ‘here’ may be defined). Using 
a human ecological perspective, this essay argues for a reappraisal of indigeneity 
in a European context, drawing on an ethnology based on topography, topology 
and, fundamentally, toposophy to transcend the binary and trinary analytical 
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confines of a world divided into Self, Other and, more recently also, Third.
The essay proceeds via two sets of triangulations. In the first, more extensive 
set, the ethnological significance of different contemporary approaches to the 
Self(s), (the) Other(s) and Third(s) is explored. The second, shorter set uses the 
Geddesian triad of Hand, Head, and Heart in order to outline briefly an approach 
that is at once topographical, topological and toposophical, drawing on the wis-
dom that ‘sits in places’ (Basso 1996). Such an approach, reconnecting ethnology 
firmly to the local oikomene, may seem counterintuitive for an attempt to release 
it from the shackles of parochialism and methodological nationalism. In the final 
section of the essay, I return to the mythological origins of all ethnology, pon-
dering the relationships of hybrid beasts, silver threads, knots and swords, in an 
attempt to unpick some of the conundrums we find ourselves facing. I hope that 
by the end of the essay, the reader might concede that there may be other, valid 
ways of seeing the local ecological foundations of our being in time than the 
methodological contempt with which these foundations have been all too com-
monly regarded in recent decades.
Triangulating Ethnology 1: Self, Other, Third
Marek Kulisz (2004: 73) reminds us that ‘we cannot speak about the Third 
without having first defined or described the Other in some way, and we can 
only speak of the Other, and the Third, after having established a perspective, as 
from another perspective the Other may turn into the Same (Self, I), the Third 
into the Other, etc.’ While this – only slightly tongue-in-cheek – observation 
seems obvious enough if not entirely self-evident, it is worth noting the (perhaps 
unintentional but nonetheless significant) conflation of ‘Self ’ and ‘perspective’ 
here. Indeed, however hard we may try to ‘put ourselves in someone else’s shoes’ 
as counsellors and ethnographers, for example, have been habitually encouraged 
to do by their teachers, we cannot escape the epistemological datum that the 
perspective we apply remains ours: that of the Self, regardless of what we might 
like and choose to call it. Many years ago, a fellow PhD-student introduced his 
project to me with the preface that it would be a Marxist analysis; by implica-
tion, he was applying a perspective based on Marx, but this would not be Marx’s 
perspective – it would invariably be the student’s version of the latter. The Self 
is inseparable from the basis of whatever perspective we seek to take. Stepping 
outside of our Self to take an Other’s perspective may appear desirable, but can 
at best only be achieved as a kind of approximation, aided by empathy and im-
agination; however Other it may seem, it remains our own perspective. But I am 
perhaps jumping ahead. 
In a recent essay, Elka Tschernokoshewa (2012: 521) reviewed the debate on 
‘difference’ in anthropological research on Germany since the 1990s, when Wer-
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ner Schiffauer (1996) diagnosed a ‘fear of difference’ in cultural anthropology, 
and Dieter Kramer (1996) asked provocatively: ‘May ethnic groups exist?’ The 
problematic was also acknowledged in sociology and philosophy, by writers such 
as Beck (2006). Much interest was directed towards issues of cultural practice and 
politics with regard to minorities (see Räthzel 1997). At the same time, postco-
lonial studies critically reframed the question of difference. One important trend 
in the literature was the attempt to release ethnicity, as a category of identity by 
self-ascription, from its common association with nationalism, imperialism and 
racism. Stuart Hall took up and further developed Derrida’s distinction between 
a difference that radically and irreconcilably separates and a contingent and con-
junctural difference, which Derrida himself termed différance. Either way, dif-
ferences are about distinctions, the making of which has become regarded with 
suspicion. Yet it is not the ontological differences per se that are suspect, but the 
political use to which any resulting distinctions are put. The critical aspect here 
is the ethics that underpins differentiation and distinction; Lévinas repeatedly 
emphasised the ontological importance and, indeed, primacy of ethics.
Ethnologies of the Self(s)
The Age of Enlightenment is usually regarded as having initiated a radically 
new era, a new way of thinking about the world and ourselves within it. From the 
point of view of considering questions of Self, Other and Third, Kapuśiński (2008: 
27) has characterised the Enlightenment trajectory in terms of ‘three successive 
turning points: … anthropologists … Lévinas … multiculturalism’. Psychologi-
cally, the Enlightenment may be compared (however fraught such comparisons 
inevitably are) to a person’s becoming increasingly self-aware – Self-aware – and 
the growing intellectual self-consciousness that grew from this process gave rise 
to projections of desiderata, such as Goethe’s ‘world literature’ or the Kantian con-
cept of the ‘cosmopolitan’. Interestingly, while much of the latter-day self-reflec-
tive historiography of anthropology emphasises the complicity of the discipline in 
the colonial project by way of ‘othering’ the Other, Kapuśiński (2008: 28) sees in 
the cultural change of the Enlightenment a ‘passing from narrow Eurocentrism to 
more universal visions’ that brings forth anthropology as ‘a new branch of social 
science … aimed towards the Other’ in a much more benign sense. By making 
the Other its object of inquiry, anthropology (benignly or otherwise) created an 
image of its society of origin, however inadvertently, in terms of what this society 
was not. Thus despite protestations to the contrary, anthropology has always been 
about the Self, too, and any anthropology of the exotic Other has always included 
an ethnoanthropological vision of who and what the Self is or should be. It is 
an epistemological paradox that we cannot define ‘them’ without simultaneously 
defining ‘us’, at least to some extent. The pretence that it could be otherwise, 
together with other factors, such as the alienation, expropriation and disenfran-
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chisement accompanied by an increasing individualisation fundamental to our 
growing consumer culture, has led to successive crises in Western civilisation, 
‘in particular the crisis and atrophy of interpersonal relations’ (Kapuśiński 2008: 
34), to which Lévinas’s theory can be seen as a reaction. The rise of anonymous 
mass society has created a context in which relations of the Self and the Other 
are marked by indifference that results from a more general lack of social ties, the 
ties that support the cultural identity of the Self. Contrary to the vision of the 
self-interested individual as an unconnected island fortress – possibly inspired by 
the insularity of the imperial power that promoted this individualist ideology – 
there has been an awareness in other cultural settings of at least the fact that 
most islands do not float in the sea but are connected to the Earth. Likewise, the 
individual, however distinct and aloof in appearance, is acknowledged as first and 
foremost a relational being, a Self that is defined by its connectedness with other 
Selves with whom he or she identifies. That identification is a transitive action; it 
works both ways and depends for its validation on mutuality. This is an ethnology 
of Self that is far removed from the hegemonic neo-liberalist anthropology of the 
isolated, impregnable individual, Master of His Destiny. The latter thinks its an-
thropos can do without any ethnos, and has sponsored a discourse of transcending 
such ascriptions – a discourse that ultimately leads to the denial of responsibility 
for anyone other than oneself (or one’s Self). 
Coming from a different cultural background, Lévinas challenged this dis-
course, emphasising ‘our duty to take responsibility’ (Kapuśiński 2008: 35) for 
the Other. His vision is one that transcends selfishness, indifference and the neo-
liberalist imperative of self-isolation and withdrawal. The Self in Lévinas’s view is 
not simply a solitary individual, but needs the Other to become and be itself; thus 
‘a new kind of person or being is created’ (Kapuśiński 2008: 37). However, that 
Other is always also another Self, an individual person, and, as Kapuśiński (2008: 
36) points out, individuals on their own are usually more reasonable than groups 
may be, and ‘[b]ecoming part of a group can change the … quiet, friendly indi-
vidual into a devil’ – history provides ample evidence. Moreover, it has frequently 
been noted that Lévinas’s ‘Other’ is White and belongs to the Western cultural 
circle. Outsiders, other Others, may find the world differently. 
Ethnologies of (the) Other(s)
As Madina Tlostanova (2004: 11; orig. emph.) observed, the discursive 
attention to ‘the problem of diaphora (difference) and diaresis (division) … [has 
highlighted] … otherness as one of the pivotal categories in the culture, litera-
ture and philosophy of Modernity’, a period dominated by a focus on the ego as 
‘foundational of the modern paradigm’. From the perspective of this paradigm, 
the Other has been customarily represented as a kind of dark alter ego, required 
by the hegemonic culture as a balance and to ensure successful self-reproduction. 
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That Other is ‘not me’; it is exterior to, yet not necessarily separate from, this 
‘me’. In the paradigm of Western Modernity, that Other is usually another hu-
man being (although alternative Others exist in other worldviews; more of that 
later). Ontologically, the implication is inevitably that the Self is at the centre of 
the Other-world and the Other thus proceeds from the self into the world within 
the Self ’s horizon (see Kockel 2010: 191). It is through our encountering this 
Other face-to-face that, according to Lévinas, we exist as subjects, by our obliga-
tion to this Other. Based on this ethically grounded ontology, Lévinas argues that 
by reducing the Other’s otherness to sameness we would deny the Other’s exist-
ence, effectively ‘killing’ her or him as a subject. Conversely, we ought to engage 
with the Other by opening ourselves up to the encounter, which challenges our 
self-referential, insular individual identity and the (false) sense of security we 
derive from the same.
Although Lévinas’s ethical ontology entails an element of constructedness – the 
Self comes into existence only by encountering the Other –, this is actually more 
a matter of ascription that can happen between Self-aware and Self-conscious be-
ings whose being as such (rather than their status as subjects) is not in question. 
By contrast, ‘the [nowadays] most often discussed and probably most conspicu-
ous feature of the Other is the concept’s constructedness – the Other exists pre-
dominantly, sometimes exclusively, in the mind of [their] creator’ (Kulisz 2004: 
73) – which, taken literally and to its ontological conclusion, raises the question 
of who or what the Other is constructed from or around. Kulisz (2004: 74) cir-
cumnavigates the constructivist cliffs by drawing on Edward Said’s (1995: 67; 
emph. M. Kulisz) reminder that 
all cultures impose corrections upon raw reality, changing it from free-floating 
objects into units of knowledge [within one’s own culture]. The problem is not 
that conversion takes place. It is perfectly natural for the human mind to resist 
the assault on it of untreated strangeness; therefore cultures have always been 
inclined to impose complete transformations on other cultures, receiving these 
other cultures not as they are but as, for the benefit of the receiver, they ought 
to be.
Said does not enlighten the reader as to where, or what, the limitations of 
this alleged naturalness of intercultural transformations might be, nor does he 
say much about whether and to what extent the mental processes involved might 
be culture specific. Summarising Said’s analysis, Kulisz (2004: 75) points out that 
‘to protect the Western mind against [perceived] Eastern excesses … [t]he Other 
had to be familiarized, which … meant what was new, foreign, and strange was 
explained in terms of, and related to, what was already known.’ However, this fa-
miliarisation is paralleled in reverse by an estrangement between Self and Other: 
‘Through this paradoxical attitude the West has given the Other a very peculiar 
status: … neither quite familiar nor quite alien – an in-betweener’ (Kulisz 2004: 
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76), living in the frontier that stretches between the Self and her or his horizon 
(Kockel 2010: 190f.).
Arising in parallel with the Enlightenment, and only superficially out of tune 
with its spirit, a paradigm emerged in Europe, culminating in the twentieth cen-
tury, according to which the relations between the own and the foreign, the 
Self and the Other, were akin to the opposition of good versus evil – a mode of 
thought characterised by ‘its dualistic and excluding character’ (Tschernokoshewa 
2012: 523). This particular offshoot of the Enlightenment emphasised notions of 
homogeneity and purity, with the inevitable consequence of demands for ‘the 
exclusion, or rather eradication, of differences.’ Responding to this paradigm, 
Lévinas postulated difference and otherness as something valuable and enriching 
that ought to be accepted without erasing the identification of the Self with the 
Other (Kapuśiński 2008: 35). He played with colloquial terms (such as the il y a) 
and coined his own (such as illeity) to support his analysis. In his early writing, 
the term ‘there is’ (il y a) is associated ‘with indeterminacy and inhumanity, with 
the pre-ethical or non-ethical sphere of “being in general …”’, a state of ‘exist-
ence devoid of existents’ that he calls the il y a (Rychter 2004: 33). Literally, il y a 
may be translated as ‘it-there-has’, which is indeed commonly rendered as ‘there 
is’ but could also be ‘that [which is] there’, which already implies an act of point-
ing outside the Self, towards the Other. Emphasising the concrete ethical over 
the abstract ontological, Lévinas argued that the ‘it’ (il) signifies its ‘itness’ (ille-
ity) ‘from the face of the other person, with a significance not articulated as the 
relation of signifier to signified, but as order signified to me’ (Levinas 1994: 47; 
quoted in Rychter 2004: 31). This ‘it’, for Lévinas, is the Third in the relationship 
between Self and Other, a Third that is, however, somewhat anachronic, out-
of-time, which he captures in the ambiguity of the French verb signifier, which 
‘can be glossed either as “to mean” or as “to command...”’ (Rychter 2004: 31), 
thus incorporating both a derivation (of meaning) and a projection (of desire), 
something from the past and something for the future. Hence the Third, through 
its anachrony, locates both Self and Other in time, and counters the erasure of 
either. 
The paradigm of homogeneity and purity has become most commonly as-
sociated with the political philosophy of Carl Schmitt, which has recently had 
something of a revival, driven particularly by the renaissance, or rather the con-
temporary invention, of a reductivist version of Enlightenment liberalism that 
thrives on the politically-motivated, highly selective reading of venerable au-
thorities, such as the much mis-cited Adam Smith. Schmitt (1996) considers the 
cultural homogeneity of any society the state of normality and a fundamental 
principle of politics, a view that leads with a certain logical inevitability to policies 
that are repressive, whether in the form of ‘compulsory assimilation of foreign 
elements, or the maintenance of the purity of the people through apartheid and 
cleansing’ (Habermas 1997: 169). Critics of this paradigm have therefore argued 
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for an opposite course of action, the embracing of the Other. However, as Kulisz 
(2004: 79) observes with reference to Rainer Marie Rilke’s novel The Notebooks of 
Malte Laurids Brigge, ‘being loved, … being psychologically embraced … deprives 
the Other of his freedom, just like the mental operations described by Said do 
on the cross-cultural scale.’ Here the erasure of the Other occurs in a different 
way, as ‘traditional Western xenophobia has been succeeded by a postmodern 
xenophilia’, which has also led in some instances to ‘a more “objective” xenol-
ogy’ (Tlostanova 2004: 11; see also Duala-M’bedy 1977, Nakamura 2000). All 
these approaches have, however, failed to come to grips with ‘the radical nature 
of otherness, reiterating absolute relativism, and accentuating the undecidability 
and ambivalence’ (Tlostanova 2004: 12) that confirms and continuously repro-
duces difference. And in the eyes of (even post-)modernity, difference spells 
‘deficiency’, regardless of whether the Other is cast as ‘demonic’ or ‘exotic’, and 
even if these two traditional stereotypes are nowadays ‘often interpreted benignly’ 
(Tlostanova 2004: 21f.). Elka Tschernokoshewa’s hybridological approach at-
tempts to transcend the dualistic paradigm. It replaces the ‘either/or’ distinction 
by a ‘both … and’ perspective on difference, raising questions of how exclusion 
may be prevented through practical action, or how different cultural resources 
can best be used and developed in community life (Tschernokoshewa 2012: 524). 
Thus it presents a fresh perspective on the relationship between Self and Other. 
The ‘both … and’ approach offers a synthesis that constitutes a Third, although 
this Third may be qualitatively different from that we encountered in Lévinas’s 
‘it’.
Ethnologies of the Third
The turn of the century saw the concept of ‘hybridity’ gain currency in post-
colonial identity debates associated especially with the works of Arjun Appadurai, 
Homi Bhabha, Stuart Hall and Edward Said. Bhabha (1994) drew attention to the 
perspectives of displaced and diasporic peoples, historically marginalised by the 
hegemony, whose migration from the ‘periphery’ to the ‘centre’ has increasingly 
highlighted the heterogeneity of the ‘national’ cultural space. His use of ‘hybridity’ 
as an ‘in-between’ concept referring to what he describes as a ‘third space’ has in-
spired arguments and theory-building across the humanities and social sciences, 
inflected by analytical frameworks such as, in particular, poststructuralism and 
constructivism. Closely linked to a critical analysis of globalisation and the post-
colonial re-mapping of the world, the use of ‘hybridity’ as a concept by scholars 
such as Hall (1991) reflects its origin in discourses by members of minority com-
munities during and in the aftermath of their struggle to overcome the no longer 
tenable binary of identity ascriptions, demonstrating identities as produced by 
multiple discourses (Tschernokoshewa 2012: 527). However, as Tlostanova (2004: 
23) has cautioned, ‘the most popular and heavily-quoted scholars, those most 
easily absorbed by the system, are those with a minimal and predictable degree 
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and nature of alterity … while those who offer alternative epistemological mod-
els to Western readers, suggesting “other” theories of otherness, remain largely 
unknown.’
Brubaker’s (2004) postulate of an ‘ethnicity without groups’, or Geertz’s 
(2000) contemplation of non-consensual culture offered attempts to overcome 
the ghosts of essentialism that are often invoked when difference is emphasised. 
Hybridology is another such attempt, but one that may reconcile and resolve the 
fear of difference with the fear of essentialism, since ‘hybridization does not mean 
that differences disappear; it merely suggests that boundaries become more per-
meable. It means that the one element is implied in the other’ (Tschernokoshewa 
2012: 525). This mutual implication of elements, reminiscent of the Yin-Yang 
relationship, has been suggested in various models of societal development, in-
cluding Fritjof Capra’s influential Turning Point (1982), which was based on his 
earlier Tao of Physics (1975) and emphasised both the idea that everything in-
volves everything else and the notion that all parts of the cosmos are really just 
patterns in an on-going process – there is motion but there are, ultimately, no 
moving objects; there is activity but there are no actors; there are no dancers, 
there is only the dance (Capra 1982). This cosmology, based on so-called ‘boot-
strap theory’, denies the existence of fundamental entities, laws, or constants. 
The properties of any particular element in this ‘cosmic web’ follow from the 
properties of all the other parts, and the overall consistency of their interrelations 
determines the structure of the entire web.
These ideas have met with a mixed reception, from earnest attempts to ap-
ply them in fields such as town and regional planning, to their outright rejection 
as emanating from the lunatic fringes of a syncretic New Age movement. While 
Capra and others at the time were influenced by Eastern mysticism, the decades 
around the turn of the century also saw the emergence of a critical literature 
drawing on other non-Western cultural backgrounds, including both non-Euro-
pean ‘high cultures’ and indigenous peoples, but also increasingly voices from the 
European margins. Tlostanova (2004: 15), having reviewed a range of alternative 
theoretical approaches, pointed out that, rather than being entirely new, ‘these 
parallel discourses emerged prior to postmodernist constructs, but remained in 
a void, invisible to the world, starting to gain some recognition only in the last 
decade of the 20th century.’ The ‘Third’ emerges as ‘one of the most interesting and 
fruitful concepts that gets re-interpreted in these newer and less-known theories 
of otherness’ (Tlostanova 2004: 16).
In theorising Self and Other, introducing the concept of ‘thirdness’, especially 
with reference to ‘the third in … dialogue, the third that increases the polyphony 
of cultures and discourses involved, can be treated as an effort further to destabi-
lize from within the opposition same/other, or self/other’ (Tlostanova 2004: 17). 
Unlike the Other, the Third exists beyond the horizon, quasi in absentiam, and 
therefore not familiarised, being instead ‘allowed to remain a complete stranger’ 
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(Kulisz 2004: 78), epitomised by the nomad who is recognised as being ‘some-
where out there’ but – unlike the Other – remains (deliberately) excluded from 
the discourse (Kulisz 2004: 79). Although the use of the triad ‘Self – Other – 
Third’ implies equivalence, the Third is in no way equivalent to the other two, as 
indicated above. Unlike the hybrid arising from the interplay of Self and Other, 
the ‘Third’ tends to be defined in ways that make it appear simply as ‘a form of 
pre-existence of the Other’ (Kulisz 2004: 79).
With regard to migration, both the ‘hybrid’ and the ‘Third’ are useful concepts; 
they denote states that may co-exist in mutually supportive as well as in conflict-
ing ways. ‘I am not half and half, but both, double, or something else’ says Irena, 
interviewed in Bautzen, Germany, during a research project on women with im-
migrant backgrounds (Tschernokoshewa 2012: 529). An interactive process of 
lived experience, migration generates something new ‘that transcends the binary 
opposition of here and there, of us and the others, ours and theirs, … a “third 
space.” There is no firm ground in this third space, there are no stops and there is 
no endpoint’ (Tschernokoshewa 2012: 530). Once again, we find ourselves at the 
intersection of temporality and spatiality, co-ordinates of our existence that are at 
once experienced, perceived and conceived. We are thus called to reconsider and, 
if necessary also, reframe our way of reflexively being in the world. The intersec-
tion of our temporality and spatiality is the place, the topos (in all its relativity) 
we find ourselves in at the point in time of our observation. 
The hybrid that is ‘both … and’ is not an easy concept in a secular age that 
rejects the ‘fully human yet fully divine’ identity of Christ as out-dated mystic-
mythic nonsense, unless one takes a step further and regards the hybrid as a 
new being born out of a union that leaves its original components intact – but 
that interpretation, projecting the hybrid as a Third, would run counter to the 
very spirit of hybridology unless, again, we shift and change our ontological 
framework beyond not only binarism but, indeed, the trinarism that a theory of 
the Third implies and necessitates. Attempts to overcome the binarism of much 
Western thought are mainly associated with postcolonial and subaltern theorists 
but have also emerged from geopolitical locations closer to the nexus of post-
Enlightenment Western thought, such as Central and Eastern Europe, regions 
that may be (and have been) interpreted as the ‘interior other’ (Tlostanova 2004: 
21) of Western epistemology. In that spirit, I have previously called for ‘a certain 
re-orientation – a re-Easting – of what it means to be a European’ (Kockel 2010: 
196). As Tlostanova (2004: 21; orig. emph.) has argued, ‘third thinking in this 
sense can be equated with epistemological decolonization … with its dis-post-
modernization’. From a Latin-American perspective, Mignolo has postulated a 
complete ‘relocation of languages, peoples and cultures, where differences are 
looked at not in one direction, but in all possible directions and regional tempo-
ralities’ (Mignolo 2000: 203; quoted in Tlostanova 2004: 27).
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Triangulating Ethnology 2: Hand, Head, Heart
Mignolo (2000: 66) diagnosed the ‘modern universal view of knowledge and 
epistemology, where concepts are not related to local histories, but to global 
designs,’ arguing that such ‘global designs are always controlled by certain kinds 
of local histories’ (quoted in Tlostanova 2004: 17). This draws attention to a 
somewhat paradoxical process by which the erasure of the grounded local is af-
fected by the elevation of a particular local history or narrow set of histories in 
the interest of power and control. When Escobar (2001: 146) observed that being 
connected with the land remains ‘an integral part of the contemporary modern 
life of … communities, even in cases in which such connectedness might be a 
vehicle for the exercise of power over them’, he pointed to yet another, related 
paradox: that precisely because ‘the local’ remains a powerful factor in a world 
increasingly perceived as mobile, footloose, neither here nor there, it can be 
perverted into an instrument of control over people. At the same time, it consti-
tutes a valuable resource with the potential to liberate – which might just be why 
the hegemony has been so evidently intent on demonstrating the suffocating 
parochialism of any interest in and attachment to the local – and why indigenous 
thinkers especially have long been emphasising its importance. Paradoxically, 
therefore, a return to the local may be a way of resolving ethnology’s predica-
ments.
Elsewhere I have developed such a perspective in some detail (Kockel 2009, 
2012), arguing that ethnology can be seen as an approach to the Local promot-
ing a comparative understanding of the Self and the Other (and therefore of 
encounters and conflicts), not only among humans but also between human and 
non-human subjects who together constitute a local ‘household’ (oikomene). As 
an applied, relational and system-oriented regional science with a local focus, it 
concentrates on local communities and issues such as migration, using multi-
sited methods. At the same time, it offers a mode of cultural philosophy based 
on self-reflexive analysis and lived experience that brings questions of origin, 
perspective and vanishing point (telos) into view, highlighting responsibilities 
that arise from one’s chosen position.
Topography by Hand
A fundamental premise of this perspective is that, in ethnological fieldwork 
as in everyday life, we have to ‘start digging where we stand’ (McIntosh 2001), 
meaning that we need to start with a clear idea of where we are at – where and 
what is this place, what time is it, and so on. The perspective therefore proceeds 
from the assumption that ‘place’ matters, not just as the construct it invariably 
also is, but as ontological datum: if we are at all, then there is a place at, in, from 
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and towards which we thus are. Any postulate of an ontological datum nowadays 
arouses accusations of ‘essentialism’. Partly justified, since ontological data are 
‘essential’ in the sense that they define aspects of being (the Latin ‘esse’ means 
‘to be’) in every sense of the term ‘define’, such accusations are based on a ‘shal-
low essentialism’ (Kockel 2012) that, driven by the hegemonic desire for erasure 
of place in the contradictory interest of market liberalism and political control, 
has seeped into academic discourse unnoticed and unreflected. The common 
critique of ‘essentialism’ tends to confuse the ontological significance of reality 
and actuality – the former designates a definite material existence regardless of 
our sensory experience, the latter factors that affect our experience regardless 
of whether they have any definite material existence at all outside that effect. 
Epistemological approaches such as phenomenology and thick description have 
tried to come to grips with actuality. Attempts to deduce from such accounts any 
insights into a reality beyond sensory experience are fraught: we simply cannot 
access a reality beyond the limits of our perceptual apparatus. Contrary to widely 
held belief, this is in fact all that critics of ‘essentialism’ are saying, although many 
go a step further, claiming that there is no such reality. But within the limits of 
our perceptual apparatus, we cannot establish that either. What we can do, as 
phenomenologists, deep ecologists and others encourage us to, is to describe 
carefully the actuality of place(s), validating our resulting accounts by diligent 
comparison with those of others, including in particular the people who inhabit 
and thereby make these places.
Whereas a ‘shallow essentialism’ makes unreasonable assertions about the na-
ture of a presumed ‘reality’ (of people and places; see Kockel 2012: 66–68), a 
‘deep essentialism’ seeks to establish, rather than assert, the relationships and 
processes through which people engage with places and vice versa. From this 
perspective, ‘place’ is accorded agency, which may strike the reader as animistic, 
or at least in some way metaphysical. It may be both, but in an age that is led to 
believe uncritically in the supreme agency of metaphysical constructs like ‘the 
Market’ or ‘interest rates’, the imposition of any hierarchies of metaphysical forces 
that may or may not be acceptable in discourse smacks of pandering to powerful 
interests that seek to affect erasure. 
‘Place’, in this framework, may be regarded as a kind of Third, the arena 
where the Self and the Other engage, and which they also engage with through 
that very relationship – we cannot meet one another except in place (even if that 
happens to be located in cyberspace). This Third, however, is not a ‘third space’ in 
Bhabha’s sense – a semi-discrete realm between the Self and the Other that may 
keep apart as much as connect them; rather, ‘place’ is always an integral part of 
our various relationships. Moreover, it is ultimately ‘place’ that brings us together 
and enables relationships – and the activities they engender – to ‘take place’. Thus 
it can be said to have agency, without any need to ‘essentialise’ it in the shallow 
sense. Philosophers like Edward Casey and Jeff Malpas have grappled with these 
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and other issues of ‘place’, as have human ecologists and indigenous scholars (see 
the essays in Williams, Roberts and McIntosh 2012). A currently fashionable 
methodology that also accords agency to non-human actors, as yet without hav-
ing to face challenges of ‘essentialism’, is Actor-Network-Theory. Networks are 
composed of nodes that are connected with one another, and nodes, whether they 
refer to an individual human being, an institutions or something else, are places 
where these actors act, since their actions have to take place somewhere in order 
to have any effect. 
Topography, the careful description of these places – where and what they 
are, how they work – provides the necessary foundation for ethnological under-
standing. Achieving such careful description may require more than the acute 
observation of the Other that one encounters in these places. Artists have woken 
up to this realisation long before most social scientists dared to peek outside their 
Ivory Tower. The need to ‘dig where we stand’ in order to come to grips with 
place may require a shovel and a wheelbarrow, or the planting of 7000 oaks (see 
Kockel 2011), in the process getting our pants dirty, as Robert Park famously 
encouraged his students to do in the 1920s. Topography, like most applied an-
thropology, is mainly a manual job requiring active engagement not just with 
the various subject(s) of our research, but with the very place that facilitates our 
encounter with them.  
Topology by Head
This deep engagement with the materiality as well as the spirit of ‘place’ needs 
a reflexive, rational methodology. I am writing in an analogue, linear pattern 
because that is how writing and reading works – it would not be intelligible oth-
erwise. But that is not how an ethnological understanding of people and places is 
developed. Some actuality is linear, but most of the time our experience will be 
of non-linear processes and relationships – some circular, some cyclical, some si-
multaneous, others asynchronous, often random and sometimes deliberate, most 
connected and a few just one-off. The perceptual apparatus we use to generate 
data for our ethnographies is usually described in terms of our five senses, but it 
has been increasingly recognised that there are more than those, perhaps the most 
important one being memory (Fig. 1).
The sixth sense, memory, incorporates recollections of the other five, but 
takes us beyond the all too common fixation with experiences of the ‘here-and-
now’, to a ‘there-and-then’ that may have been in the same place or elsewhere. 
Including memory as part of our apparatus also broadens the scope of inquiry, 
not just to the past of the Other, which we explore by our hearing (their oral tes-
timony) and sometimes vision (such as when they show us old photographs), but 
beyond, to our own past as experienced and now remembered. Because our Self 
relates to and engages with an Other in a place we simultaneously co-create and 
seek to understand, we need to shed pretences of ‘objectivity’ and acknowledge 
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that we cannot tell the story of this place and the Other in it without telling our 
own – and vice versa – as the ‘writing culture’ debate has been reminding us since 
the 1980s. This requires emotional and intellectual effort if we want the outcome 
to make sense to anyone other than just ourselves. We must understand a place 
from within, but in order to be able to explain it to others – which is what our aca-
demic ethnology is all about – we must distance ourselves from it and translate our 
experience. Topography, even at its most careful and sophisticated, is not enough; 
untranslated it remains a self-centred exercise of the individual ethnographer, not 
much good to anyone else. The same goes for much of contemporary cultural 
studies. However, there is an issue here pointing well beyond the scope of this es-
say – that of intercultural translation. Can experience be translated from one place 
to another without loss (or gain)? And if not, how do we deal with the difference? 
Is such difference always a bad thing? One might agree that loss is, but is that nec-
essarily so? And is a gain always a good thing? Answers to these questions may be 
found in the places we relate to, but rarely immediately so; finding them requires 
a different kind of approach than was needed to achieve the careful topography 
outlined above, and perhaps even a different kind of rationality. 
Figure 1: Perceptual sensory sources of ethnography 
The emplaced relationships between Self and Other(s) can be represented in 
terms of logical identity perceptions projected across different fields of enactment, 
where ‘logical’ refers to a certain knowledge of the Self (= autological) and the 
Other (= xenological), intentionally conveyed in the act and directed at both the 
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Self and the Other, often simultaneously. For the purpose of illustration, I want 
to distinguish just two types of identity, which I shall refer to as ‘home identities’ 
and ‘public identities’ (Kockel 2007). Both relational, as identities always are, their 
orientation is very different. ‘Home identities’ are inward-directed, defining the 
individual vis-à-vis him- or herself, while ‘public identities’ are outward-directed, 
projecting that individual in relation to an outside world of Others. Each of these 
has in turn ‘inward’ and ‘outward’ aspects. For ‘home identities’, these may be 
called ‘autological’ – affirming knowledge about the Self to the Self – and ‘xeno-
logical’: projecting aspects of such knowledge towards (usually selected) Others. 
For ‘public identities’, a distinction may be made between ‘performance’ directed 
from the present towards the future (what the Self wants to be seen as, by it-Self 
and Others) and ‘heritage’, directed from the present towards the past (where the 
Self wishes to have come from). This distinction could equally be cast in terms of 
‘constructivist’ and ‘essentialist’. Figure 2 illustrates the four fields thus mapped. 
For example: A person speaking Gaelic in Northern Ireland by that speech act 
autologically affirms their identity for their Self, while the same act connects them 
with Others who share the same heritage, familiarising these Others to the point 
where they become almost-Selves. Xenologically, that performance includes an 
empathic audience of Others who, while they may not speak the language, appre-
ciate its significance to the actor; at the same time it excludes all Others – speakers 
and non-speakers alike – who do not (wish to) share that heritage version.
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Figure 2: Home and Public Identities (adapted from Kockel 2007)
These performances ‘take place’, in the dual sense of happening somewhere, 
and acquiring that somewhere, occupying it, and using it, sometimes as a mere 
backdrop, but more often as a key actor in the performance – one that is an in-
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tegral part both of the Self and the Other, a relationship affirmed by the perfor-
mance. The Marching Season in Northern Ireland, with its ritual demarcations of 
historical identity territories for present and future reference, is a salient example 
of this (Kockel 2010). To those not in or from a place, such performances may 
often seem incomprehensible, even irrational; yet they follow an ethnologic that 
claims its place. Topology, the empathic translation of careful topography into 
knowledge accessible beyond the place of its creation in the interaction of Self 
and Other, must draw on a wide spectrum of methodologies to achieve its pur-
pose, including an appropriate level of reflexive auto-ethnography. The process 
is iterative and cyclical, not linear. We cannot start inductively, with topography 
that leads to topology, which then generates toposophy. Rather, we are thrown 
into a situation where we start with what little sense of a place we may have, and 
try to assemble a meaningful narrative about what happens. If that seems a bit 
like Grounded Theory, appearances are not too far off the mark. Topology uses 
Grounded Theory as it does other methodologies, but roots them firmly in place; 
it is important not to lose sight of the place in which the Self engages with the 
Other, and on that foundation gradually to develop a deeper sense of this place 
and all its relations.
Toposophy by Heart
Places come in a variety of shapes, forms and significances. There are, for ex-
ample, accidental places that pop up and disappear leaving barely a trace; fleeting 
places detached from their moorings that turn up next to other places and may 
temporarily change the composure of either or both; passing places where events 
of significance can be avoided as actors proceed in opposite directions (or one of 
them can rest for a while before journeying on to an actual place of engagement). 
It may be time to introduce Place as a capitalised concept, to designate what 
toposophy is all about: Place as a site of wisdom that is born out of encounters 
between Selves and Others on their manifold trajectories, where Selves and Oth-
ers may include ‘other-than-human persons’ (Hallowell 1960). Toposophy in that 
sense is about ‘deep’ places (or Places), built through layers of memory, where 
community – in the broad human ecological sense (McIntosh 2008) – takes its 
place and its time. Before the spectre of a ‘shallow essentialism’ raises its head 
again: any place can be such a ‘deep’ Place, and no place is a Place by some ‘natu-
rally’ ordained law that would make it any better than other places. Toposophy is 
about understanding what it is that makes some places more, or differently, ‘deep’ 
than others, what their respective ‘depth’ entails, and what all that means to the 
respective locals and outsiders, the Selves that are variously Others or Thirds. 
Western scholarship has acknowledged the existence of ‘sacred places’, which 
have attracted attention from several genres across the range of the social sciences 
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and humanities, including geography, which is often administratively put with 
the natural sciences. But according to many indigenous scholars, all ground is 
sacred, if only because the elders cannot be sure which bits are and which are not 
(see Nabokov 2007). Places therefore exude some kind of ethical imperative – to 
tread gently, since we do not know where we go, and to dig with reverence, since 
we do not know where we stand. That applies to all places, until we understand 
them well enough to do otherwise. Whether we may have achieved a sufficient 
understanding is a question neither for our-Selves alone nor for Others them-
Selves on their own to answer, but rather a matter of our relational engagement 
with these Other Selves and the various significant Thirds that affect – in the dual 
sense of that term – the Place of our encounter. 
Knots and Swords, Hybrid Beasts and Silver Threads
If that sounds as if the discourse has ended up in knots, or lost in an a-maze-
ment all of its own, it would be in good company among the plethora of post- and 
postpost-modern cultural theorising. Let me try to unpick at least some of it.  
The discourses of Self, Other and Third revolve around the central issue of 
trying to grasp difference and similarity, and to link these with concepts of agen-
cy. Whereas the Self is a relatively straightforward (if not entirely uncontested) 
category, the Other is more difficult to categorise beyond the acknowledgement 
that he or she ultimately is a Self other than ours. It should also be noted that the 
analytical power of any discourse of the Other depends not least on the language 
in which it is conducted; for example, in German the Other can be rendered as 
Fremde, a term that can take three different genders with at least four different 
meanings, including one – the Other as ‘frontier’ – that is psycho-geographically 
linked to the Self and its position in relation to its cultural horizons, whereby ‘the 
self is at the centre of the frontier (das Zentrum der Fremde ist das Eigene) and … 
the frontier emanates from the self into the world (geht vom Eigenen aus in die Welt 
hinein)’ (Kockel 2010: 191; orig. emph.). In contrast to Self and Other, which can 
both be associated with and understood in terms of the Western concept of in-
dividual agency, the Third is rather more metaphysical. It can be a kind of ‘black 
box’ used conceptually to lump together sundry ill-perceived or indeed imagined 
agents. This ‘black box’, occasionally described as ‘the Other’s Other’ (see Kulisz 
2004: 79), is a way of contending with the non-Western – that is, Oriental, Exot-
ic – ‘barbarians out there’, where the ‘there’ is beyond our horizon. Alternatively, 
the Third is not so much an ‘in-between’ space (which would separate them) as 
a space ‘shared between’ Self and Other, the metaphysical copula between Self 
and Other that at best creates a shared isolation from the world beyond, in line 
with the Western image of an isolated individual who now, however, consists of 
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both Self and Other. Here, then, is difference as positive diversity, rather than as 
negative exclusion. 
There are three basic paradigms of ‘diversity’ – ‘cultural differentialism, cul-
tural convergence, and sharing diversity – associated with different politics of 
multiculturalism (Nederveen Pieterse 1996). In this context, the hybrid’s capacity 
to cross boundaries and mediate diversity has been celebrated, but to the extent 
that hybridity becomes normal routine it loses that transgressive power; so ‘what 
do we mean by cultural hybridity when identity is built in the face of postmodern 
uncertainties that render even the notion of strangerhood meaningless?’ (Werb-
ner 1997: 2). Does the notion of the Other as stranger lose its meaning in a hybrid 
world? And what about the Third? Is this a way of moving beyond Other and 
Third, towards a more harmonious world of – the Self? 
When confronted with the Gordian knot, historians surmise that Alexander 
the Great may not have used his sword but pulled the knot off its pole to expose 
both ends of the rope. Is it perhaps time to acknowledge that the whole ethno-
logical enterprise has not been corrupt just because some, or even most of its 
past practitioners took a wrong turn? We cannot go back and reinvent ethnology, 
undo those wrong turns. What we can do is take the good in the enterprise and 
raise it to a new level, fashion appropriate concepts and analytical tools, build on 
them. The aspect I have tried to highlight in this essay is the significance of place, 
the material location in the oikomene that transcends the human-focused atten-
tion given to Self, Other and Third. Place is said to be progressively eroded by 
globalisation processes popularly referred to as McDonaldization (Ritzer 1993). 
However, ‘McDonaldization’ may be not so much about the creation of an ab-
solute sameness (the sense in which the term is often used), but rather about an 
underlying sameness that ensures the powerful coherence of superficially diverse 
cultural expressions. Just as a ‘shallow essentialism’ (Kockel 2012) has given rise 
to problematic and contradictory theorising about the nature of difference, so a 
‘shallow diversity’ that is actually a theorised post-modern indifference can ob-
scure social divisions and group conflicts. Simon Harrison has analysed cases 
where for a particular community ‘similarities with outsiders, rather than differ-
ences, are the principal perceived threats to its identity’ (Harrison 2006: 150) – 
sameness and assimilation, rather than differentiation, as problematic.
The hybrid has become a fashionable image; ‘non-White, non-European eth-
nicity’ is in vogue and ‘the more peasant-like and low-class this ancestry is, the 
better’ (Tlostanova 2004: 22). One may wonder whether this self-othering of 
academic analysts, the deliberate and emphatic association with the subaltern, 
is a better form of intellectual Anbiederung than the association with hegemonic 
interests that many ethnologists of a different era pursued. Or should we rather be 
concerned with ‘disinterested inquiry’? Again, one wonders whether the cham-
pions of an anodyne version of epistemology might have particular interests at 
heart. The hybrid is a persuasive idea and a useful analytical tool, but it does 
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not take us beyond the constraints of an ultimately Self-centred discourse that 
acknowledges the various presences of Others and Thirds. A discourse of ‘hybrid’ 
brings to my mind images of Centaurs and the Minotaur. Classics scholars see the 
latter as representing the tributary relations of the city of Athens with Crete, and 
the slaying of the beast as breaking that dependency relationship. We have been 
a-maze-d by a discourse of Self, Other and Third. To lead him out of the maze 
of the Minotaur, Theseus relied on a thread Ariadne had given him – Ariadne, 
daughter of an earlier age, whom he abandoned after returning to safety. It might 
be worth looking again at the thread the older half-sister of the beast provided, to 
see whether it might lead us out of the maze by another way, to a place ‘on the far 
side of revenge’, a place where ‘hope and history rhyme’, as the late poet Seamus 
Heaney wrote in The Cure of Troy (1990) – there to find the displaced and aban-
doned Ariadne, and this time to try making a new home with her.
References
1. Appadurai, Arjun (ed.) 2002. Globalization. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
2. Basso, Keith 1996. Wisdom Sits in Places. Tuscon: University of Arizona Press.
3. Beck, Ulrich 2006. The Cosmopolitan Vision. Cambridge: Polity.
4. Bhabha, Homi K. 1994. The Location of Culture. London: Routledge.
5. Brubaker, Rogers 2004. Ethnicity without groups. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
6. Capra, Fritjof 1982. The Turning Point: Science, Society, and the Rising Culture. New 
York, NY: Bantam.
7. Capra, Fritjof 1975. The Tao of Physics: An Exploration of the Parallels Between Modern 
Physics and Eastern Mysticism. Boston, MA: Shambala.
8. Duala-M’bedy, Munasu 1977. Xenologie: Die Wissenschaft vom Fremden und die Ver-
drängung der Humanität in der Anthropologie. Freiburg & Munich: Alber.
9. Escobar, Arturo 2001. Culture sits in places: reflections on globalism and subaltern 
strategies of localization. Political Geography 20: 139–174.
10. Geertz, Clifford 2000. Available Light. Anthropological Reflections on Philosophical Top-
ics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
11. Habermas, Jürgen 1997. Die Einbeziehung des Anderen. Studien zur politischen Theorie. 
Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp. 
12. Hall, Stuart 1991. Old and New Identities, Old and New Ethnicities. In: Anthony 
D. King ed., Culture, Globalization and the World-System. Contemporary Conditions for 
the Representation of Identity. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 41–68. 
13. Hall, Stuart 1997. New Ethnicities. In: Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tif-
fin eds, The Post-Colonial Studies Reader. London & New York: Routledge, 223–236. 
14. Hallowell, I. 1960. Ojibwa Ontology, Behavior, and World View. In: Stanley Diamond 
ed., Culture in History: Essays in Honor of Paul Radin. New York: Octagon.
15. Harrison, Simon 2006. Fracturing Resemblances: Identity and Mimetic Conflictin Mela-
nesia and the West. New York & Oxford: Berghahn.
16. Kapuściński, Ryszard 2008. The Other. London: Verso.
38
17. Kockel, Ullrich 2012. Being From and Coming To: Outline of an Ethno-Ecological 
Framework. In: Lewis Williams, Rose Roberts & Alastair McIntosh (eds), Radical Hu-
man Ecology: Intercultural and Indigenous Approaches. Aldershot: Ashgate, 57–71.
18. Kockel, Ullrich 2011. Morphogenetic Fieldwork and the Ethnologic of Toposophy: 
Meditation on a Coyote Wandering on Rannoch Moor. In: Christa-Maria Lerm Hayes 
& Victoria Walters (eds), Beuysian Legacies in Ireland and Beyond: Art, Culture and 
Politics. Münster: LIT, 195–219.
19. Kockel, Ullrich 2009. Wozu eine Europäische Ethnologie – und welche? Österreichis-
che Zeitschrift für Volkskunde LXIII/112(3), 39–56.
20. Kockel, Ullrich 2007. Heritage versus Tradition: Cultural Resources for a New Eu-
rope? In: Marion Demossier (ed.), The European Puzzle: The Political Structuring of 
Cultural Identities at a Time of Transition. Oxford and New York: Berghahn, 85–101.
21. Kramer, Dieter 1996. Dürfen Ethnien sein? Zur Diskussion um das Recht auf An-
derssein. Info-Blatt der Gesellschaft für Ethnographie 11/12, 54–65.
22. Kulisz, Marek 2004. Thirdness as Absence. In: Wojciech Kalaga ed., The Same, the 
Other, the Third. Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, 72–80.
23. McIntosh, Alastair 2004. Soil and Soul: People versus Corporate Power. London: Aurum.
24. McIntosh, Alastair et al. 2008. Rekindling Community: Connecting People, Environment 
and Spirituality. Cambridge: Green Books, in association with WWF International and 
the Centre for Human Ecology.
25. Mignolo, Walter 2000. Local Histories, Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowl-
edge, and Border Thinking. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
26. Nabokov, Peter 2007. Where the Lightning Strikes: The Lives of American Indian Sacred 
Places. New York: Penguin. 
27. Nakamura, Yoshiro 2000. Xenosophie: Bausteine für eine Theorie der Fremdheit. Darm-
stadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
28. Nederveen Pieterse, Jan 1996. Globalisation and Culture. Three Paradigms. Economic 
and Political Weekly, June 8, 1389–93.
29. Räthzel, Nora 1997. Gegenbilder: Nationale Identität durch Konstruktion des Anderen. 
Wiesbaden: Opladen.
30. Rychter, Ewa 2004. The il y a and illeity: Traces of Thirdness in Emmanual Levinas’s 
Ethical Language. In: Wojciech Kalaga ed., The Same, the Other, the Third. Katowice: 
Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, 29–44.
31. Schiffauer, Werner 1996. Die Angst von der Differenz. Zu neuen Störungen in der 
Kulturanthropologie. Zeitschrift für Volkskunde 92 (1): 20–31.
32. Schmitt, Carl 1996. Die geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus. Ber-
lin: Duncker& Humblot. 
33. Tlostanova, Madina 2004. Shades of Otherness vs. Poles of Otherness: From “Classic” 
Postmodern to Other Models of Otherness. In: Wojciech Kalaga ed., The Same, the 
Other, the Third. Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, 11–28. 
34. Tschernokoshewa, Elka 2012. Hybrid Worlds of Europe: Theoretical and Practical 
Aspects. In: Ullrich Kockel, Máiréad Nic Craith and Jonas Frykman eds, A Companion 
to the Anthropology of Europe. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 519–36.
35. Werbner, Pnina 1997. Introduction: The Dialectics of Cultural Hybridity. In: Pnina 
Werbner & Tariq Modood eds, Debating Cultural Hybridity. Multi-Cultural Identities 
and the Politics of Anti-Racism. London: Zed, 1–26.
39
U L L R I C H  K O C K E L
ETNOLOGIJA ir SĄVOKOS AŠ, KITAS bei TREČIAS:
TOPOSOFINIAI AIŠKINIMAI 
 
S a n t r a u k a
Viešoje ir netgi akademinėje erdvėje yra žinomi konkretūs etnologijos esmės 
ir jos sampratos stereotipai. Amerikos kontekste tai yra „mokslas apie ak-
menis, kaulus ir balsus“, visų pirma siejant ją su archeologija, biologine an-
tropologija ir lingvistika. Europietiškame kontekste tokios stereotipinės nu-
ostatos yra taip pat gerai žinomos, tačiau čia šis mokslas dažniau siejamas 
su britų socialine antropologija ir netgi laikomas jos sinonimu. Kitu atveju 
etnologija čia įvardijama europietiškąja (ar kurios nors konkrečios tautos) 
etnologija, taip pabrėžiant jos ideologinę (kai kada – ir praktinę) atskirtį nuo 
senamadiškų folkloro tyrimų, šiuo metu dažnai įvardijamų kaip „greitosios 
pagalbos“ etnologija (angl. „salvage ethnology“). Būtent europietiškosios et-
nologijos sampratoms aiškinti yra skirtas šis straipsnis. Autorius čia tęsia 
savo jau ankstesnėse publikacijose pradėtą diskusiją apie „parapines“ et-
nologijos metodologinio nacionalizmo nuostatas, kai šis mokslas ir jo 
ištakos istoriškai (pagrįstai ar nepagrįstai) yra tuo kaltinami.
Įvairių teorinių idėjų bei praktinių jų realizavimo atvejų istoriniai tyrimai 
atskleidžia gausius tokių kaltinimų liudijimus, tačiau visada verta pabrėžti, 
kad čia netrūksta ir ne mažiau gausių priešingų faktų, leidžiančių suvokti 
etnologiją ir kaip savo kultūrinių nuostatų esme tarptautinę, lyginamąją 
ir netgi kosmopolitinę mokslo šaką. Nėra lengva viename straipsnyje visa 
tai išsamiai apžvelgti, argumentuoti ar kontrargumentuoti. Realu yra tik 
apsibrėžti vieną kurį nors šios problematikos šiuolaikinių idėjų ir praktinių 
tyrimų ypatumų aspektą ir jį išsamiai aptarti. Taip autorius elgiasi ir nusta-
tydamas šiame straipsnyje aptariamų aktualijų ribas. 
Jis pabrėžia, kad etnologija jau kuris laikas įprastai siejama su tautos (naci-
jos) konstravimo sampratomis ir tuo būdu čia visų pirma yra plėtojami tau-
tiniu pagrindu parengti moksliniai projektai. XIX a. istoriniame bei socia-
liniame kontekste tai padėjo aiškiau apibrėžti vienų ar kitų tautų esminius 
bruožus, tautinių valstybių iškilimą, tačiau ne tik Centrinės, Rytų ir Pietų 
Europos šalių istorijos atvejais. Tačiau ir XX a. kai kurios Vakarų Europos 
tautos iškėlė regioninio nacionalizmo idėjas (Katalonija, Škotija), tapusias 
reikšmingais politiniais judėjimais. Kartu čia yra natūraliai operuojama bei 
diskutuojama sąvokomis Aš (Pats, Savas) ir Kitas. O Centrinėje Europoje 
(ypač Vokietijoje) dėl objektyvių istorinės ir ideologinės patirties priežasčių 
iki pat šiol vengiama kalbėti bet kokiomis vietinėmis regionalizmo ar na-
cionalizmo temomis. Čia bet koks tautinės kultūros paveldo kontekstual-
izavimas vietos ar atminties aspektais moksliniuose projektuose vis dar su-
siduria su rimtomis problemomis.
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Vietos bruožai yra nulemti ne vien bendruomenės narių tarpusavio saitų, 
apibrėžtų geografinėmis ribomis. Čia veikia ir atitinkami socialiniai bei 
moraliniai gyvensenos kriterijai, galintys dar esmingiau paveikti ir nulemti 
asmeninės bei etninės tapatybės nuostatas. Tai ypač aktualu įsisąmoninti 
grupėms, vienu ar kitu laiku susidūrusioms su fatališkomis nacionaliz-
mo ar kolonializmo praeities patirtimis. Tai ypač išryškėja įgyvendinant 
tautinės gyvensenos projektus su grupėmis („iš čia“) ir persikėlėliais iš 
kitų geografinių sričių („iš kitur, svetur“). Žvelgiant iš humanistinės 
ekologijos perspektyvų šiame straipsnyje ieškoma argumentų naujiems 
vietinių tapatybių įvertinimams šiuolaikinės Europos kontekste. Siekdama 
paaiškinti trejopos sandaros Pasaulio įvaizdį, kur išskiriamos sąvokos Aš 
(Pats, Savas) – Kitas – ir Trečias, etnologija šiuo atveju remiasi ir topografi-
jos, topologijos ir netgi toposofijos mokslų nuostatomis.
Straipsnyje aptariama dviejų lygmenų trejybių sistema. Pirmuoju lyg-
meniu autoriaus dėmesio akiratyje išskiriama bene ryškiausia minėtoji 
trejopų sąvokų Aš (Pats, Savas) – Kitas – ir Trečias sfera. Antroji, san-
tykinai mažiau apibrėžta, yra Rankos, Galvos ir Širdies triada, siejama 
atitinkamai su jau minėtų topografijos, topologijos ir toposofijos mokslų nu-
ostatomis, liudijančiomis poziciją „išmintis glūdi vietose“ (Basso 1996). 
Tokia pozicija leidžia suvokti atitinkamą „vietą“ ne kaip vienaip ar kitaip 
suformuotą objektą, o kaip ontologinį atskaitos tašką. Kitaip tariant, jeigu 
pripažįstame savo paties egzistavimą, privalome pripažinti ir objektyviai 
egzistuojančią „vietą“ („erdvę“), kurioje esame, kuri yra čia pat prieš mus 
ar už mūsų. Tokios ontologinės nuostatos postulatai šiais laikais dažnai 
kaltinami esencializmu ir yra grindžiami „paviršutiniško esencializmo“ 
samprata. Verta pripažinti, kad kontroversiški laisvosios rinkos liberalizmo 
ir politinės kontrolės interesai esmingai lemia „vietos“ sampratos mobi-
lumo ir galimybės ją netrukdomai perkelti „kitur“ galimybes ir kad toks 
atvejis akademinėje aplinkoje iki pat šiol tebėra ignoruojamas – nepastebi-
mas ir neaptariamas.
 
